While few would doubt that in the period between the 1798 Irish rebellion and the lifting of the Corn Laws Britain’s relationship with Ireland changed dramatically, it seems clear that such changes in policy resulted less from the initiative of such governments than in response to agitation and pressure from the Irish themselves. What was referred to as ‘The Irish Question’ by successive Westminster governments was not so much a matter of constructive policy than an exercise in damage limitation, designed to limit the impact of popular agitation on the status quo. Where concessions were granted through Catholic Emancipation or, (in the eyes of it’s architects) the Act of Union, these moves were not initiated by a spirit of reform or enlightenment on Britain’s initiative, but rather in response to pressure brought to bear on them from the Irish, and motivated by a cynical desire to appease and quell discontent and thus avoid more fundamental changes in policy.

The clearest example of this can be viewed in Wellington’s response the constitutional crisis provoked by 1828 County Clare by-election. Brought to the fore not by British initiative but by the popular pressure raised by O’Connell’s Catholic Association, Catholic Emancipation was opposed both by Westminster and the overwhelming majority of British public opinion. Both groups instead preferred to rely on the support of the Protestant Ascendancy in maintaining the status quo, with Catholic Emancipation long ignored as the price for the Ascendancy’s support moves more clearly beneficial to British interests such as the Act of Union. This was, of course, despite the protestations of a more forward-looking individuals, such as William Pitt.

When Emancipation was finally granted, therefore, the British initiative was a classic one. Catholic Emancipation, as instituted by the British was not part of any long-term strategy to win the loyalty of the Catholic people, but rather a policy change of last resort to avoid the civil discontent warned of by the canny O’Connell and his supporters. The cynicism and reluctance inherent in this move is obvious; Wellington and his Irish secretary, Robert Peel had been, until pressure had been brought to bear upon them, amongst Catholic Emancipation’s most vociferous opponents. The resulting Catholic Relief Act, therefore, was not an example of any real progression or reformist zeal by any means, but rather a window-dressing exercise forced upon them by external pressure. With its provisions limiting the franchise, the Act was not designed as any attempt at settlement, but rather one to remove momentum from the Association and the chances of pressure for further change, whilst doing all possible to ensure the preservation of the Protestant Ascendancy’s dominance.

Such window dressing would similarly be an apt description for the Act of Union passed 28 years earlier. Hailed by its proponents as a philanthropic attempt to bridge the gap between Celt and Anglo-Saxon once and for all, it was, more clearly a cynical, if wily, response to the rebellion, rather than any constructive initiative in itself. The 1798 rebellion had sought to bring together Protestant Ascendancy and the Catholic peasantry alike under a single nationalist movement to agitate Britain for outright independence. The Act of Union, in tandem with the Catholic Emancipation proposed by Pitt, sought to prevent this from happening by granting the Irish a voice within a United Parliament in Westminster, albeit one in which they had a diminished voice. At the same time, the inducements offered to members of the Protestant Ascendancy, such as the promised of protection against future Catholic agitation and protection for the linen manufacturers in Ulster, sought to crystallize the divide between Protestant and Catholic and circumvent the dream of individuals such as McCracken and Wolf Tone of a ‘united Irishmen’.

In doing so, the Act of Union- and the subsequent failure to grant Catholic Emancipation- can not be read as an example of British policy initiated or planned by Westminster, but rather a response to the 1798 rebellion. Its primary concern was not, as was to an extent claimed, constructive measures to address the long-term problem of Ireland’s s relationship with Ireland, but rather designed to undermine the forces behind the rebellion. In this way, the Act of Union was a move dictated by external pressures upon existing British policy. Such changes consequently show little willingness for real change, but rather, like the granting of Catholic emancipation, a reluctant exercise in window dressing designed to defuse crisis whilst maintaining the status quo wherever possible.

The only stage where such a theme appears to be less applicable is during the reforms undertaken by Peel in the 1840s. Despite the antagonism felt towards him by the Irish, the period of relative economic stability between the granting of Catholic Emancipation and the Potato famine is the clearest example of a British government taking the initiative on affairs relating to Ireland without significant external pressure. Policies based on Peel’s stated belief that “mere force…will do nothing as a permanent remedy for the social ills of Ireland”, such as the Colleges Bill and Maynooth grant which sought to secure Ireland through the establishment of a moderate Catholic political class, therefore demonstrate the ability of British government policy to be pro-active in its approach, although far from consistently.

For all the proactivity of these measures, their effects were cosmetic rather than addressing fundamental political and economic grievances of the Irish Catholic majority. More deep-seated measures proposed by Peel from 1844 onwards were consistently rejected by a British parliament unwilling to engage in any major policy shifts on behalf of Irish interests, preferring, it would seem, to respond later to any violent pressure on the part of the Irish which might result. Such measures included a Franchise Bill based on £5 to all freeholders which failed to gain support from the House of Commons and was therefore rejected, along with bills aiming to reform landlord-tenant relations which met with antipathy in the Lords. As a result, Peel’s seemingly proactive reforms concerning education and support for the Catholic priesthood were merely the barebones of a truly reformist package, with what was left amounting to little more than a coercive response itself. Shying away from the political and economic grievances which would have tackled some of the discontent which fuelled O’Connell’s repeal movement, measures such as the Maynooth grant instead sought to eat away at the ranks of O’Connell’s support, and aimed to create a depoliticised, ‘respectable’ Irish Catholic clergy and middle class who would pose less of a threat to British rule.

Consequently, these reforms should be seen, like much of the rest of British government policy over the period, as piecemeal changes to structures which were allowed to endure in spite of external pressure. Westminster policy was consistently applied to respond to the individuals and groups driving such pressure, rather than anticipating and addressing the grievances which motivated them. From the duplicity inherent in Wellington’s granting of Catholic Emancipation whilst simultaneously limiting the franchise, to the use of the Act of Union to cynically divide the Irish People in response to the 1798 rebellion, it is clear that throughout this period, British government policy in Ireland was not initiated by any long-term plan for stability and tranquillity. In place of meaningful policy change was a series of acts designed to scupper the pressure brought to bear upon it by those who threatened the status quo, making it a responsive, rather than proactive policy driven by external pressures alone.

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