Active support wasn’t really crucial, passivity is always enough. Whilst Hitler personally enjoyed tremendous personal support, you need to remember that despite their personal devotion to him, Germans were initally very suspicious of the Nazi Party as an organization. So much so that there was no real desire for it, in and of itself, to be running the country. Hence the need for the Night of the Long Knives, in which Hitler purged the party of its more anti-establishment, radical elements, such as the thugs in the SA under Ernst Rohm, and in doing so, gaining the support of establishment figures.

Fascist rises to power, in contrast to leftist ones, typically don’t take the form of revolutions, per se. Unlike a typical leftist revolution, in which the old establishment is largely displaced and replaced with a completely new (but usually just as bad) ruling class, Fascist takeovers tend to me a more orderly handover of power, more to do with backstairs intrigue than barricades.

In Germany, the Nazis had the support of old establishment figures such as Hindenberg, Ludendorff etc; solid old war heroes, and symbols of the proud Imperial Prussia of the Kaiser. With economic chaos and social disorder (actively encouraged, though, perhaps not directly initiated) by the genuinely revolutionary elements of the Nazi party, these old guards viewed Hitler, and the conservative face of Nazism, as means through which stability could be brought – breathing new life into the established state, not destroying it.

Once Hitler had established himself as a figurehead which appealed to the German people, and he, and the conservative; ‘respectable’ wing of the Nazi party had secured the support of the old elites and business leaders, he was free to dispose of the revolutionary element of the Nazi party and take control via effectively constitutional means.

It was only as time went by, and very gradually, that the Nazi party was able to break down the old organs of the German state bureaucracy. Examples such as the marginalization of the Foreign Ministry by Hitler’s pal Ribbentrop, gradual absorption of the old German police and internal security services into their Nazi counterparts at the Gestapo, the gradual subordination of the army into the SS over the course of the war…the Nazification of the state itself was still ongoing in 1945; it was an evolution, not a revolution, built on the existing foundations of the German political system and civil service, its capacity and expertise.

Because of that, a Fascist America might not have required anything nearly as radical as one might expect. I use the past tense there, because my own view is that Fascism, in the sense that we relate it to Hitler, Mussolini etc. is a primarily 1930s phenomenon. It was never an independent ideology, and was largely based around the unique circumstances of that period in history. What we might describe as ‘Fascism’ in 2007 would have to be something almost unrecognisably different. In the 1930s, however, it doesn’t seem impossible.

Roosevelt’s New Deal, despite being a triumph in terms of the precedents it set and the psychological impact it had on the American mindset following the hammer-blow of 1929, actually achieved very little concrete in terms of economic recovery. It’s generally agreed that by 1937, the programme had all but ended, having been wound up by the Supreme Court, and otherwise was facing popular disillusionment and savage opposition from resurgent business leaders. If it had not been for Roosevelt’s ability to switch political attention abroad, it’s perfectly possible that he would have found himself in a similar position to his social democrat counterparts in Germany and Italy prior to Fascist takeover.

The Liberty league, made up of the Rockefellers and all the other business leaders, (which Prescott Bush and Joseph Kennedy, were, at least to some degree, also associated with), did in fact discuss the possibility of some kind of political re-organization to remove FDR and put in place someone favourable to their interests.

I find it interesting that Jon Ston assumes that Middle America would have necessarily opposed this orderly handover. Fascism, although usually driven into power with the collusion of conservative elites, also typically maintains at least a populist pretence, specific to each circumstance. The strongly anti-communist elements of Fascism which had been around even before the ‘Red Scares’ of the early 1920s were well established in the US. The desire for a homogenous sense of national identity and national culture was also extremely prominent; very few underestimate the isolationist tendencies of middle America, right up until Pearl Harbour. Consider the Quota Act which effectively halted immigration, the tariffs which sought to achieve economic independence in a similar manner to Mussolini’s ‘Autarky’.

There are also parallels to be made between the way in which Latin America was (is) viewed as lying within the US sphere of influence and Hitler’s view of Eastern Europe as a resource to be harnessed for Germany’s benefit. Even the elements of rascism which set Nazism apart from other types of Fascism are present; 6 states had, at this time, in place laws which authorized the sterilisation of ‘undesirable’ social elements (including the rural poor in Tennesee and West Virginia), as well as, of course, your run-of-the-mill segregation throughout the South. Indeed, one Prominent Eugenicist in Tennessee went so far as to complain to state education officials that the Nazis were in danger of overtaking them in their study of the subject.

I agree that Fascism could not have simply been transplanted into the American heartland direct from Germany, Spain and Italy, but something home-grown, framing Fascist core beliefs in language and political terms already part of the political discourse does seem possible. There’s no reason why such an American Fascism would have been linked to Hitler or Mussolini any more closely than the two were linked to each other. After all, Fascism is a fundamentally nationalist phenomenon. However, if aided to some extent by European counterparts, it does seem that it might well have taken hold without too much of a change in circumstances.

In terms of leaders, your imagination needs to stretch slightly beyond a carbon-copied Hitler figure with a mid-western accent. He would have been a home-grown, wholesome, charismatic small-town-hero-made-good from relatively humble origins, a popular hero who’s appeal went beyond politics. Charles Lindbergh, the aviator, is often mentioned in these circumstances. Although I’m not sure about him and how strong those links are, he does seem to fit the mould. A kind of white, typical, all-American hero viewed as representing the WASP’s conception of national identity. A family man, but with the elements of racism and willingness to depart from the political traditions (e.g. the Constitution) of a democratic society, but in a subtle, gradual way, with everyone so transfixed on his promises to make the nation great and powerful once again, that nobody really notices.

I can’t see a figure such as Huey Long, the southern hell-raiser who was assassinated, being able to do it; he was too recognizably radical and militant in a nation which had too long an experience of political continuity to embrace such a divisive figure, the same applies to Father Coughlin, the most recognizably Fascist of the three…

Either way, however, in the 1930s at least, Fascism in the US was certainly a possibility, albeit with an all-American face.

Considering Roosevelt’s popularity and its unprecedented ambition there appears to be a strong consensus amongst historians, and the body of evidence, that in political terms, the New Deal did indeed represent a “revolution” of the kind Degler describes. However, the New Deal’s impact on the social and economic life of the nation is less clear. Critics such as Bernstein, pointing to the business-friendly aspects of the NRA and Roosevelt’s timid attitude to spending have concluded, “The New Deal [programmes] did not transform the American system; they conserved and protected American corporate capitalism”^[2], contending that for all the New Deal’s political impact, it was ultimately conservative in its motives and constituted a missed opportunity for structural change to the American economy.

However, Bernstein seems to ignore the fact that neither the New Deal nor the vast majority of Americans ever sought such changes. Anthony Badger recognizes this, and instead concludes that, political successes and economic shortcomings aside, the New Deal unwittingly acted as a “holding operation for American society”[3], staving off radicals such as Huey Long and Francis Townsend and preventing further collapse until the Second World War brought more fundamental change. Even this, however, appears to sell the New Deal far short, ignoring the lasting effect of the reforms and programmes of the New Deal era, which, as Leuchtenburg acknowledges, transformed the country to enough of an extent that when prosperity resumed, it would be on a far more sustainable manner than before.

Despite this, Badger’s reference to the New Deal as a ‘holding operation’, when economic factors alone are considered, appears justified. In 1939, the outbreak of war in Europe, 1 in 5 Americans were still reliant on relief and unemployment still stood at 9.9% compared to 24.9% in 1933. In 1937, the year in which the New Deal effectively ended, unemployment stood at 14.3%, down to just 4.7% in 1942.[4] This considered, it is hard to dispute that Roosevelt’s inauguration goal in 1933 that, “Our greatest primary task is to put people to work”[5] lay largely unfulfilled. The rise in unemployment figures in 1937 demonstrates that the New Deal’s effect on unemployment was temporary and reliant upon government spending to sustain it.

The real transformation in America’s employment levels it seems, came in the years between September 1939 and 1941 when it fell by almost 12% thanks increased demand for American armaments from Europe, and later through direct involvement in the war. The temporary nature of the gains in employment secured by the New Deal, contrasted with the lasting employment following the war therefore substantiates Badger’s claims of the New Deal being a ‘holding operation’, with the war having the real transforming effect.

However, it seems questionable whether, if the New Deal had indeed been little more than a “holding operation”, the Second World War would have presented the opportunities it did or even whether, without it, America would have been in the position to have mobilized for war in the first place. Set aside from the results of Roosevelt’s programmes to restore employment and ease hardship, the New Deal was genuinely transforming in less tangible ways. The psychological impact of the collapse in 1929 should not be underestimated, with the resultant crisis of confidence in the financial structures of the country constituting not just an obstacle to recovery but also threatening further collapse.

Exacerbating this was Hoover’s dogged commitment to non-intervention, viewed as paralysis and was the antithesis of the confidence-rebuilding measures which were crucial for Americans to begin using the banks, issuing credit and purchasing goods again. Converse to Hoover’s claims that “Economic wounds must be healed by the action of the cells of the economic body – the producers and consumers themselves”[6], the success of the New Deal in reversing crisis clearly constituted a transformation both in how Americans viewed their government’s role, but also in the change of mindset from which this stemmed.

This regeneration of confidence is perhaps the clearest example of the New Deal’s transforming power. Roosevelt’s programmes brought about a transformation in the outlook of Americans, restoring a sense of national pride and economic confidence which in 1933 had lain in tatters. In contrast to Badger’s conclusion that the New Deal’s transformation being limited and transitory, Leuchtenburg recognizes that “in declaring that there was no fear but fear….Roosevelt….made his greatest single contribution to the politics of the 1930s: the instillation of hope and courage in the people”^[7] This appears justified in light of the half a million Americans who wrote to Roosevelt within his first week in office and in the unparalleled electoral success he enjoyed throughout the 1930s.

The “very totality”^[8] of grandiose gestures such as closing the banks and the flurry of legislation emanating from congress transformed the national mood. The recovery from the psychological traumas of collapse which this permitted constituted the first major step towards recovery. Neither the hollow rhetoric and claims in 1930 that, “I am convinced we have now passed through the worst”^[9], nor the war, which Americans would initially regard with trepidation and reluctance was capable of doing this, leaving it to be considered among the New Deal’s most transforming consequences.

In concrete terms, too, it is difficult to view the initiatives of the 100 days as a predominately conservative ‘holding operation’. Roosevelt’s regulation of financial institutions demonstrates reforming ambition and a commitment not simply to re-starting the superficiality of 1920s bubble, built on speculation and unreliable credit, but to sustained, long-term reform of the economy. The 1933 Banking Act represented a willingness to go further than ever before, reforming the Federal Reserve Board, insuring banks and addressing the weaknesses underlying the pre-1929 system. The success of these measures is clear; Leuchtenburg notes that “fewer banks (sic) suspended during the rest of the decade than even in the best single year of the twenties”[10]

While it seems clear from the outcomes the 100 days and the US government’s subsequent survival that these aims were met, this does not, of course, negate Badger’s claims to the New Deal being primarily a transitory, conservative phenomenon which preserved, rather than transformed the existing system. The faces behind these reforms were far from new, certainly, with Arthur Ballentine, Hoover’s Undersecretary of the Treasury remaining in his post and the Banking Act being drafted by bankers who could hardly be described as a change of face from the pre-1929 order.

Indeed, Time Magazine, looking back in 1935 on the one year anniversary of the SEC which had been set up by the Act, observed that its chairman, Joseph Kennedy was, “no New Dealer… He was a Wall Street financier and a skilful practitioner of much that the New Deal deplored. During the 1920’s he had been in the thick of cinematic mergers, deals and syndicates”^[11] Leuchtenburg even goes so far as to claim that “The emergency banking bill represented Roosevelt’s stamp of approval for decisions made by Hoover’s financial advisors”^[12].

In light of this, it seems that despite of Degler’s lyricism about the New Deal representing the rejection of laissez faire capitalism, the Banking Act was hardly the work of new faces or a fundamental break with the past. Rather, it was the work of the old, pre 1929 order preserving itself and interests. Far from seeking to transform the structures of American capitalism, the NRA and Banking Acts shored them up. Badger comments that “The consequences of banking and securities reform were conservative precisely because Roosevelt wanted to restore conservative investment practices”^[13], and it certainly appears that Roosevelt’s aim, despite his rhetoric about the “money changers” being “driven out”^[14], was no more than the preservation of American capitalism, albeit on more sustainable terms.

At the same time, Badger’s conclusion that the result of this amounted to some kind of life support system seems somewhat insufficient. The Banking Act, NRA and other initiatives of the ‘first’ New Deal did not fundamentally change the underlying assumptions of the American economy, but they did not simply preserve it either. Whilst Roosevelt mirrored the content of many of Hoover’s policies, he took them further than his predecessor had dared, representing a genuine transformation in the government’s willingness to involve itself in the economy, as well as in the framework within which it operated, to a significant extent.

However, in asserting that the Roosevelt’s efforts did not come close to matching the Second World War’s economic transformation of the economy, Badger has a valid point. Noting that “he failed to embrace early enough a compensatory fiscal policy”^[15], it does appear that Roosevelt’s conservative fiscal attitudes were the most significant constraint on the extent to which the New Deal was able to transform economically.

Keeping with the economic consensus of the time, Roosevelt, despite the government spending increase which the New Deal represented, remained wedded to the idea of a balanced budget. Whilst the willingness of Germany and Scandinavia particularly to embrace Keynesian ideas of stimulating demand through government deficit spending ensured that these countries were among the first to escape the global depression, Roosevelt refused to make such a commitment.

Leuchtenburg points out that “Roosevelt trusted in common sense…total commitment was required, and total commitment he would not give…The Keynesian formula for…creating huge deficits year after year seemed to defy common sense”^[16]. In this respect, Roosevelt’s much-vaunted pragmatism must be seen as a conservative constraint on the New Deal. Indeed, upon meeting Roosevelt, Keynes wrote in an open letter that “In the past orthodox finance has regarded a war as the only legitimate excuse for creating employment by governmental expenditure. You, Mr President, having cast off such fetters, are free to engage in the interests of peace and prosperity the technique which hitherto has only been allowed to serve the purposes of war and destruction.”^[17]

In fact, it was not until The Second World War came that Roosevelt felt able to heed Keynes’ advice, with government debt rising from 40% of national GDP in 1941 to 125% in 1945, compared to no significant increase over the New Deal Years^[18]. As a result, it is difficult to see Roosevelt’s attitudes to spending amounting to the revolution claimed; instead pointing to a sense of conservativism which limited the New Deal’s transforming economic impact.

‘The Roosevelt recession’ in 1937 which resulted from his efforts at fiscal conservatism exposes the transience of the progress made, and their continuing dependence upon government expenditure. This suggests, in support of Badger’s ‘holding operation’ conclusion, that whilst the content of New Deal programmes had not (as Roosevelt had believed) erased the spectre of depression, the expenditure they represented (which Roosevelt had sought to reduce) was not large enough to generate permanent recovery either. The result was a temporary mechanism which whilst having neither the spending power to ‘prime the pump’ nor the coherence for the programmes themselves to resolve the economic difficulties, left the economy in a state of ‘limbo’ , preventing further collapse whilst doing little to bring transformation; a “holding operation”[19] of the kind Badger describes.

It was at a social level that the New Deal and its programmes brought the greatest transformation of American Society. Whilst perhaps in and of themselves inadequate to stimulate recovery, they did play a major role in clearing the rubble of economic collapse and preparing the ground for future recovery in a more long-lasting and stable manner than the preceding boom. Leuchtenburg notes that “when recovery did come, it was much more soundly based because of the New Deal project”^[20].

In just 8 years, Works Progress Administration built 651,087 miles of highways, roads and streets; and constructed, repaired, or improved 124,031 bridges, 125,110 public buildings, 8,192 parks, and 853 airport landing fields^[21]. Simultaneously, the Civilian Conservation Corps undertook projects such as the tree-planting ‘shelterbelt’ which safeguarded against the kind of dust-storms and drought which had so plagued farmers even through the years of prosperity in the 1920s. In tandem with programmes such as the TVA and rural electrification, this constituted nothing less than a transformation of America’s public infrastructure, which, for all the boom of the 1920s had been neglected, and leaving it in a far better state for wartime mobilization and recovery.

While critics point out that neither the WPA or the CCC enjoyed the scale of funding necessary to kick start recovery in the same way that the war eventually did, the presence of these public works was hardly disadvantageous. A modern infrastructure of roads, the electrification of rural areas and the combating of soil loss all doubtlessly contributed to the United States’ ability to mobilize itself on the outbreak of war in 1941. Similarly, whilst the immediate economic impact of Icke’s agency was perhaps, as suggested, negligible, the capacity of post-war prosperity to perpetuate itself for several generations was in no small part thanks to the social infrastructure bequeathed to the country by the New Deal.

Even the Civilian Conservation Corps, whose lack of capital-intensive projects and focus on providing temporary employment Badger laments as a wasted opportunity had its uses. According to C.P Hill, “the Civilian Conservation Corps made its workers fit and alert and gave them technical skill, leaving them greatly in demand from employers”.^[22] If this is the case, then even temporary projects such as the Civilian Conservation Corps which might have otherwise been seen as part of Badger’s “holding operation”[23] had clear transforming effects in providing a generation with the skills, work ethic and energy upon which both the war could be fought and post-war growth, built

Economic and social achievements aside, there is little doubt that the New Deal between 1933 and 1941 transformed America’s political landscape forever. Roosevelt’s unprecedented four victories with among the largest mandates in American history leave little to be desired in terms of successes, and such popularity should be seen as evidence of the New Deal’s transformation of the American political system. Badger himself notes that “The lasting loyalty of lower-income voters to Roosevelt expressed their appreciation of the very real and essential benefits they received”, bringing into focus the permanent political impact of Roosevelt.

The ‘New Deal coalition’ radically expanded the Democrat’s traditional base beyond ‘wets’ and immigrant groups and southern whites, to include labour unions other minority groups such Jews and the Irish. Even blacks, ardent loyalists to the Republican ‘party of Lincoln’ deserted the party en masse. Black historian Nancy J. Weiss notes that “…the New Deal changed the voting habits of black Americans in ways that have lasted to our own time.”[24] The continuation of this trend as recently as 2004 and the continued loyalty of many of these groups to the Democrats therefore clearly demonstrate the New Deal’s lasting success in transforming the American political landscape for the rest of the 20^th century and beyond.

Roosevelt’s presidency also represented a permanent transformation in the relationship between the individual and the state. Under the New Deal, many were brought into direct contact with the previously distant federal government for the first time as it became directly involved through the provision of unemployment insurance and projects such as the Rural Electrification Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. By personalising this relationship to such an extent in the eye of the American citizen, the New Deal, along with FDR’s own amiable persona and his ‘fireside chats’ contributed to a new form of ‘personality politics’ with the president viewed as an instigator of change, rather than merely a safe pair of hands. Although the desirability of these developments is, in itself, a matter of political controversy even today, it nonetheless seems likely that without Roosevelt’s precedent many post-war reforms, driven by presidential mandate against a less supportive Congress would not have been possible.

This legacy, combined with Roosevelt’s appointment of Supreme Court judges throughout his presidency ensured that New Dealers dominated American politics for at least a generation. The New Deal therefore transformed the political agenda of the country far beyond the limits of its own programmes, setting the precedent for further socially-focused and civil rights legislation well into the 1960s, to a large extent compensating for the New Deal’s conservative constraints in these areas.

Consequently, there can be little doubt that the New Deal was indeed a transforming force which left a lasting impact on American society and making it a fundamentally different place in 1941 than it had been in 1933. At the same time, critics such as Bernstein are right to conclude that the New Deal had clear limitations. It was not the “revolution”[25] which Degler lauds; neither did it constitute a “rejection of laissez faire capitalism”[26] as he claims. The reluctance of Roosevelt to take the leap of embracing Keynesian economics which both Leuchtenberg and Badger note, his willingness to adopt and continue many of the techniques and ideas of his predecessors, as well as the New Deal’s shortcomings in areas of wealth redistribution and in bringing economic recovery itself all show that the New Deal could act both as a constraint, as well as an advocate of economic and social transformation in 1930s America.

However Badger’s conclusion that such, largely self-imposed, pragmatism confined the New Deal’s role to that of a transitory ‘holding operation’ is flawed. The long term political consequences of the New Deal and the precedents it set, as well as it’s reforms to the infrastructure and financial systems ensured that whilst to a large extent the impact of the New Deal was not fully felt in 1941, it had nonetheless transformed the political, social and economic structures of the country far beyond where they had been in 1929, laying the precedent for subsequent change and prosperity both in the war years, and beyond.

^[7] William Leuchtenberg Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (1963) p. 42

^[8] ibid. Leuchtenberg p. 42

^[9] ibid. Hoover State of the Union

[10] ibid. Leuchtenberg p. 60

^[11] unatrib. (1936) ‘Reform and Realism’ Time Magazine

(Time Magazine Online http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,754995,00.html)

^[12] ibid. Leuchtenburg p. 43

^[13] ibid. Badger p. 308

^[14] ibid. Samuel Rosenman

^[15] ibid. Badger p.303

^[16] ibid. Leuchtenberg pg 42

^[17] John Maynard Keynes An Open Letter to President Roosevelt The New York Times December 16, 1933 quoted in New Deal Network (1998) (http://newdeal.feri.org/nation/na34302.htm)

^[18] US Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt Historical Debt Outstanding (2007)

(http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo3.htm)

^[19] Ibid, Badger

^[20] Ibid. Leuchtenburg. p. 347

^[21] Jeffrey B. Morris and Richard B. Morris eds., Encyclopedia of American History, 7th Ed (1996) p.457

^[22] C.P. Hill, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, (1975) p.56[23] ibid, Badger p. 311

[24] Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR. (1983)

[25] ibid, Degler

[26] ibid, Bernstein

It was the War, rather than Republicanism, which initiated the economic boom of the 1920s. The destruction of much of the European powers’ agricultural and industrial capacity presented huge demand for American products, allowing many industries to reach maximum output, and encouraging widespread expansion. Combined with the introduction of techniques such as the assembly line and a plethora of consumer products such as domestic appliances and cars, a boom became unavoidable, the only question of economic policy being how it should be managed, if at all. With foreign demand for traditional industries such as grain and oil fuelling domestic spending on new consumer products such as cars and radios, technology met with geo-political fortuity to create an economic boom in which Republican policy seems to have played a relatively small part.

On the other hand, that these circumstances converted into continuous growth over this period suggests that Republican economic policy must have had a role to play. After all, the marked rise in disposable income could easily have been dampened by a consequent rise in taxes, whilst the emergence of new industries such as Ford’s might have been heavily restricted by an excess in government regulation in working practices and competition. That the Republicans under Harding, Coolidge, and, to a lesser degree, Hoover, did precisely the opposite would suggest that their economic policy, whilst not the instigator of the boom, played no small part in allowing it to continue unabated. As a result, republican policy was significant in that it provided the environment of freedom within which an economic opportunity was able to take hold and establish itself to an unlimited degree.

The price of an unlimited explosion, however, was the utter lack of recourse it allowed should it end as quickly as it began. The Republican’s fear of intervention prevented all from being done to ensure that quick and sudden profits permeated throughout American society in order to create longer-term prosperity across the country as a whole. Even given a 28% increase in GNP between 1921 and 29, 1/3 of this was held by just 5% of the total population, suggesting that economic expansion was far less pervasive than one might expect. Whilst not excusatory to the existence of the boom itself, the presence of such inequality does demonstrate the failure to translate a surge in demand and its subsequent profits into concrete improvements to the nation’s infrastructure or the prospects of a large percentage of the population as a whole. In doing so, the potential for further growth was limited, as, confined to only part of society, consumer demand was bound to become saturated. Whilst taxation which might have been enacted to correct this inequality may also have restricted the scale of the boom, it is equally true that it would also have limited the scale of the subsequent collapse by increasing spending amongst groups such as blacks, rural workers and urban poor, which were otherwise excluded from the boom. The unwillingness of the republicans to do this, therefore protected them from any negative effects of taxation or other intervention, but at the same time exposed them, and the nation, to the full brunt of the decline. As a result, the clear inequalities in American society fostered under Republican leadership were responsible for both the intensity of the boom, but also the inevitability of its sudden end.

The short-termist nature of the boom encouraged by Republican policies is also strongly apparent in its dependence on both consumer demand and confidence in the form of credit. Much of the demand for the new products at the heart of the boom depended on the willingness of consumers to buy in anticipation of their ability to pay later through the range of hire-purchase and credit schemes which developed throughout the decade. This was taken to the extreme through the development of ‘buying on the margin’ with which repayment of credit was almost entirely dependent on the continued increase in the value of shares bought with it. Such schemes resulted in a massive collective reliance on the economy’s continued good-fortune, as well as in a culture of indebtedness within which the collapse of a single debtor could have a negative knock-on effect throughout the entire economy. Whilst the precarious nature of such arrangements cannot be directly blamed upon specific Republican policy, it is a continuation of a theme consistent with features of the boom in which they were more directly involved, such as a failure to prevent the over-extension of the banking system and closer regulation of interest rates, and thus would appear to be another area in which the policies of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover simultaneously ensured the intensity and short-lived nature of the 1920s boom.

However, perhaps the most compelling argument in their defence is the lack of precedent. Never before had such growth been seen as even possible, nor the depression which was to follow. In such light, it is perhaps unfair to judge Republican policies too harshly for their inability to anticipate the hitherto unknown. It is also clear that Republicanism was not responsible for initiating the ‘Roaring 20s’, but rather for adopting a policy of non-intervention which allowed the boom to proceed almost entirely unimpeded. As a result, Republican responsibility must be judged in terms not of what they did, but what they did not. In doing very little to regulate nor intervene in the boom from 1921-29, successive Republican administrations were, to the greatest extent, responsible for ensuring that what occurred was not a long-term trend of steady, social economic growth, but a short-lived boom. Furthermore, rather than making efforts to convert this into growth which permeated throughout, bringing even longer-term benefits to American society as a whole, these policies were content to sit back and allow America to become a gambling den on a majestic scale, almost entirely dependent on the fickle nature of human confidence and reliant on an impossibly limitless demand for new products which soon reached saturation point. As a result, Republican policies must be seen to a great extent responsible for shaping the nature of the economic boom, if not instigating it, and in doing do, directly responsible for the inevitable bust which followed.